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CHAPTER 4
DIALECTICAL AND HEURISTIC ARGUMENTS: PRESUMPTIONS
AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Fabrizio Macagno
In law, as in everyday conversation, presumptive reasoning is one of the most
common forms of drawing conclusions from a set of premises. OnWalton’s view
(Walton 1996b: 13), whereas in deduction conclusions are necessarily true if the
premises are true, the conclusion of a presumptive reasoning is a simple pre-
sumption, that is, it holds in conditions of incomplete knowledge and is subject
to retraction should these conditions change. These arguments are grounded on
generalizations such as, ’Birds fly’ or ’Americans love cars’, leading to conclu-
sions of the kind: ’Plausibly, this bird flies’ or ’Bob, who is from Michigan, prob-
ably loves cars’. However, these arguments cannot be evaluated in light of stan-
dards accepted in logic (Walton 1993: 3), and their function is not to provide that
premises necessarily imply a conclusion or to provide evidence based on statis-
tical results. Everyday conversation is characterized by incomplete knowledge,
in which only few propositions can be considered necessarily true, and only a
limited number of data is collected. What is the role of plausible or presumptive
arguments, if not leading to truth or statistically backed generalizations? More-
over, how can they be assessed, if the logical standards do not apply? The answer
can be found shifting the paradigm from the logical concept of truth of a conclu-
sion to the pragmatic notion of dialectical effects of a conclusion. Presumptive ar-
guments are not true or false; they produce some effects on the dialectical setting
of the interaction between interlocutors. The function of presumptive arguments
is to shift the burden of proof (Walton 1989: 16; Walton 1988), that is, if the inter-
locutor is committed to the premises, he should be committed to the conclusion
as well, or he has to show why the conclusion is not acceptable.
The dialectical nature of presumptive reasoning can be analyzed by inquiring
into what a presumption is. We can analyze the following arguments (seeWalton
1996b: 17):
1. John’s hat is not on the peg. Therefore, John has left the house.
2. John has been missing for 5 years. Therefore, he can be considered as dead.
These arguments are clearly different in nature, and presuppose different types
of background information. However, we can notice how they are both grounded
on implicit premises shared by the interlocutors, namely that ’When John leaves
the house, he wears his hat’ and that ’A person not heard from in five years is pre-
sumed to be dead’. They are both presumptions, as they provide a reason to infer
a conclusion from a fact, and they arematter of common knowledge, namely they
are not formal logical rules, but they are part of what is commonly known. How-
ever, while the first argument can be uttered in a context in which John’s habits
are known, the second is based on a rule of evidence (California Evidence Code,
45
master April 26, 2010 16:21 Page 46 !"#$
!"#$ !"#$
!"#$
46 CHAPTER 4. MACAGNO
section 667). Both arguments are reasonable and provide a probative weight in a
situation in which a conclusion has to be reached from incomplete information.
The purpose of this article is to inquire into the grounds of Walton’s theory of
presumptive reasoning, examining the concept of presumption and its dialectical
effects. In particular, the role of the presumption in shifting the burden of proof
will be examined (see Walton 2007; Hahn, Oaksford 2007). The role of presump-
tion in everyday conversation will be analyzed starting from a particular type
of natural dialogue, the legal discussion. Legal argumentation, conceived as a
highly codified type of dialectical reasoning, can provide some general princi-
ples, which can be applied to reasoning in other types of human communication.
4.1 Presumption in argumentation
In order to describe what a presumption is, it is necessary to specify the level
of our inquiry. As seen above in the introduction, presumptions are analyzed
in argumentation considering factors such as the probative weight and the con-
clusion, or viewpoint, to be supported. However, such elements presuppose a
dialogue, in which there must be necessarily subjects interacting. In such con-
text, the first step is to describe what kind of action is performed by the subject
when the presume something. Following Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984),
we hold that when placed in a context of dialogue, every reasoning or argument
is an action, or rather a complex action, carried out to accomplish a specific com-
municative purpose.
Walton (1992b; 1993, see also Walton and Godden 2007) describes presump-
tion in the light of the rhetorical and logical theories as a particular speech act.
Presumption can be described according to its propositional content and illocu-
tionary effects (see Searle 1969: chapter 3) as “a proposition put in place as a
commitment tentatively in argumentation to facilitate the goals of a dialogue”
(Walton 1993: 138). From an illocutionary point of view, presumptions are acts,
by means of which the Speaker requests the interlocutor in a dialogue to com-
mit to a proposition, and should the Speaker fail to reject his or her commitment
to the proposition, it will be taken as commitment of both parties in the sub-
sequent dialogue (see Walton 1992b: 56). This provisional and mutual type of
commitment pragmatically differentiates presumption from statements, which
change the Speaker’s commitments by including therein the proposition object
of the speech act, and assumptions, which actually do not change the interlocu-
tors’ commitment store, as they can be freely rejected at any point in a dialogue.
Walton summarizes the conditions for the speech act of presumption as follows
(Walton 1992a: 6061):
I. Preparatory Conditions
A. A context of dialogue involves two participants, a proponent and a
respondent.
B. The dialogue provides a context within which a sequence of reasoning
can go forward with a proposition A as a useful assumption in the
sequence.
II. Placement Conditions
A. At some point x in the sequence of dialogue, A is brought forward by
the proponent, either as a proposition the respondent is asked explic-
itly to accept for the sake of argument, or as a nonexplicit assumption
that is part of the proponent’s sequence of reasoning.
B. The respondent has an opportunity at x to reject A.
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C. If the respondent fails to reject A at x, then A becomes a commitment
of both parties during the subsequent sequence of dialogue.
III. Retraction Conditions
A. If, at some subsequent point y in the dialogue (x ¡ y), any party wants
to rebut A as a presumption, then that party can do so provided good
reason for doing so can be given. Giving a good reason means show-
ing that the circumstances of the particular case are exceptional or that
new evidence has come in that falsifies the presumption.
B. Having accepted A at x, however, the respondent is obliged to let the
presumption A stay in place during the dialogue for a time sufficient
to allow the proponent to use it for his argumentation (unless a good
reason for rebuttal under clause III. A. can be given).
IV. Burden Conditions
A. Generally, at point x, the burden of showing that A has some practical
value in a sequence of argumentation is on the proponent.
B. Past point x in the dialogue, once A is in place as a working presump-
tion (either explicitly or implicitly) the burden of proof falls to the
respondent should he or she choose to rebut the presumption.
These conditions apply to all defeasible arguments (see Prakken, Reed, Wal-
ton 2005); however, an additional requirement is set in (Walton 2009), namely
that A cannot be proved (or disproved) by evidence, i.e. the situation is one of in-
complete knowledge. Therefore we have to add other conditions of presumption
(Walton 2009; Prakken, Sartor 2009), in particular that the inference is sufficiently
strong to shift the burden of providing evidence to the other party. The effect in
the dialog must be that the interlocutor must give some argument against it, or
else he will risk losing the exchange.
These conditions show the dialectical effects and requisites of the speech act
of presumption. Presumption is shown as simply requiring a context of dialogue,
and unless rejected it shifts the burden of proving or disproving the proposition
onto the interlocutor.
This account describes how presumptions work in a dialogue game; however,
this account of presumptions seems to have further implications on the argumen-
tation theory. If we examine this type of speech act using Searle’s categorises,
we can notice that another difference between presumptions and assertives or
assumptions can be found at the level of preparatory conditions. Whereas state-
ments and assumptions have as a propositional content a sentence (for instance,
’I state (or assume) that Bob is ill’), presumptions always require a reason, which
can be stated or simply presupposed. It would be perfectly sound to state ’I state
(or assume) that Bob is ill, but there are no grounds to believe that’, but stat-
ing that ’I presume that Bob is ill, even though there are not reasons’ would be
unreasonable. While assumptions are propositions put forth to prove a further
conclusion, but need to be proven later in the discussion in order to be accepted,
presumptions are the result of a reasoning. The act of presumption requires, as a
preliminary condition, the existence of some grounds supporting it. For this rea-
son, presumptions are always the conclusion of an explicit or implicit argument.
On this perspective, presumptions become integral part of the complex act of
argumentation. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst maintain that argumentation is
a complex speech act “composed of elementary illocutions belonging to the cate-
gory of assertives” (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 34; Walton 1992b: 177).
However, Walton points out how the conclusions of arguments are attempts to
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steer the interlocutor’s commitment towards a specific proposition (see Walton
1996b: 38), while the function of an argument is “to effect a shift of presumption
towards the proponent’s side” (Walton 1992b: 189; for the discussion on the bur-
den of proof, see Prakken2004; Prakken, Sartor 2006). Arguments, on Walton’s
account, are presumptive as their conclusions can be considered presumptions
relative to a certain proposition, and because their purpose is to effect a shift of
burden of proof relative to the thesis that the Speaker defends. On this view, we
can notice how the success of an argumentative move can be evaluated accord-
ing to the felicity of the act of presumption. A good presumptive argument is
an argument that shifts the burden of proof onto the interlocutor. On this view,
therefore, presumptions are considered as conclusions of a reasoning pursuing a
specific dialogue effect, and at the same time speech acts characterized by their
argumentative nature.
However, this relation between presumptions and arguments rises a crucial
question: are all argument presumptive? Do all arguments shift the burden of
proof in the same fashion?
4.2 Presumptions in law
A presumption in law is “an inference made about one fact from which the
court is entitled to presume certain other facts without having those facts directly
proven by evidence” (Hannibal, Mountford 2002: 464). Legal presumptions were
introduced in Roman law to indicate different types of conclusions of inferences,
and were divided into three categories, presumptions of fact, presumptions of
law, and the so called praesumptio iuris et de iure, or irrefutable presumptions.
When facts were deemed proved only on the grounds of logical rules, namely
rules not provided by law but only shared by the common knowledge (Camp,
Crowe 1909: 9 Ency. of Evidence, 882), the presumption was classified as prae-
sumptio facti or praesumptio hominis, namely presumptions of fact (Berger 1954:
646) or permissible inferences (Park, Leonard, Goldberg 1998: 105). Presump-
tions of fact are simply conclusion that the court may draw from certain facts,
that is, are not mandatory (Keane 2008: 656). They are based on rules of infer-
ence from a previous experience of the connection between the premises and the
conclusion. For instance, an example of presumption of fact may be “things once
proved to exist in a particular state continue to exist in that state”. If one party in
a trial proves that a man was alive on a certain date, the factfinder may presume
that he was alive on a subsequent date.
Presumptions of law, or true presumptions (Park, Leonard, Goldberg 1998:
102-105), express legal and mandatory relationships between certain facts (called
basic facts) and certain other facts (the presumed facts). They are not rules of
inference drawn from everyday logic, but rules provided by law. An example of
presumption of law can be the following ones (California Evidence Code, section
667; 663):
A person not heard from in five years is presumed to be dead
A ceremonial marriage is presumed to be valid.
For instance, if one party wants to prove that a couple is married, but has
not enough evidence, he just needs to prove that a marriage ceremony had been
performed. In such case, the factfinder must presume that the marriage is valid.
The last type of presumptions, called irrebuttable presumptions, expressmanda-
tory relationships between the basic and the presumed facts, but they cannot be
rebutted (Hannibal, Mountford 2002: 465). For instance, irrebuttable presump-
tions can be the following ones (Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s. 50;
California Family Code 1994, s. 7540):
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No child under the age of 10 can be guilty of an offence.
The child of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent
or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of a marriage.
Therefore, if a child is proven to be under the age of 10, he is innocent and
no evidence can rebut this conclusion. Irrebuttable presumptions are rules of
substantive laws, and they are judgments, not simply instruments of evidence
(Park, Leonard, Goldberg 1998: 106).
The three types of presumptions can be differently rebutted. Presumptions
of fact can be rebutted by simply providing contrary evidence. Irrebuttable pre-
sumptions, on the other hand, do not admit any refutation. True presumptions,
at last, admit different types of rebuttal strategies. The party against whom a
presumption would operate has several choices (Park, Leonard, Goldberg 1998:
107). For instance, we can apply those possibilities to the rule of presumption of
death in the following case (Miller v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, 457 F.2d 378 (1972)).
After twenty-two years of marriage, Mrs. Miller’s husband per-
manently left the household onMay 17, 1957. Aside from a telephone
call received from him several days later, Mr. Miller has not been seen
nor heard from since. All efforts to find Mr. Miller were unsuccess-
ful. Mrs. Miller commenced a proceeding in the Orphans’ Court of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania to have Mr. Miller declared a pre-
sumed decedent.
The possibilities of the appellee, in this case Mr. Richardson, the Secretary of
Health Education and Welfare, were the following ones:
1. Offer not evidence challenging the existence of either the foundational facts
or the presumed facts. E.g. Mr. Richardson does not provide evidence. The
man is considered dead.
2. Offer evidence challenging the existence of only the foundational fact. E.g.
Mr. Richardson proves that the man wrote a letter three years before the
trial. In this case, the presumption of law is rebutted.
3. Offer evidence challenging the existence of only the presumed facts. E.g.
Richardson shows that the man left the family home shortly after a woman,
whom he had been seeing, also disappeared, and that he phoned his wife
several days after his disappearance to state that he intended to begin a
new life in California. In this case, the presumption is rebutted as Miller’s
disappearance was not unexplained and implicit in his departure was an
intention to continue living.
4. Offer evidence challenging the existence of both the foundational and the
presumed facts. In this case, simple foundational evidence would be suf-
ficient to rebut the presumption. For instance, Richardson proves that the
man wrote a letter three yeas before the trial stating that he intended to
start a new life elsewhere.
This scenario shows the general principles of persuasion. However, true pre-
sumptions (or presumptions of law) are different in strength, namely they re-
quire different rebuttals fulfilling different standards. They can be classified in
three levels (Andersen 2003: 112; Lempert et al. 2000: 1235-47):
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1. mandatory burden-of-pleading-shifting presumptions: If the party proves
A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party claims B is
not true
2. mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumptions: If the party proves
A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party introduces ev-
idence sufficient to prove B is not true. Sufficient evidence may be defined
as any evidence, reasonable evidence, or substantial evidence.
3. mandatory burden-of-persuasion-shifting presumptions: If the party proves
A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party persuades the
factfinder that B is not true. Persuasion may be defined anywhere from a
preponderance to beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the first case, the opposing party has only to deny the charges. This type of
presumption is set at the beginning of the pleadings, in which the defendant has
only to file an answer to the summons. The second and the third case involve a
crucial distinction between burden of persuasion and burden of production. The
difference can be explained as follows (Murphy 2007: 71):
The term ’burden of proof’, standing alone, is ambiguous. It may
refer to the obligation to prove a fact in issue to the required standard
of proof, or to the obligation to adduce enough evidence to support a
favourable finding on that issue.
The allocation of the burden of persuasion follows general rules relative to the
type of offence. In criminal cases burden is on the prosecution to prove the facts
essential to their case (see Woolmington v DPP AC 462 (1935)), whereas in civil
cases “he who asserts must prove”, i.e., the burden rests with the plaintiff (the
party bringing the action) (Keane 2008: 98). Another type of burden of proof is
the evidential burden of proof, which corresponds to the burden of proving all
elements essential to the claim.1 As Murphy puts it (Murphy 2007: 71):
Every claim, charge or defence has certain essential elements, the
proof of which is necessary to the success of the party asserting it. For
example, a claimant who asserts a claim for negligence asserts: 1) that
the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care; 2) that the defendant,
by some act or omission, was in breach of that duty of care; and 3) that
as a result of that breach, the claimant suffered injury or damage for
which the law permits recovery. These elements derive, not from the
law of evidence, but from the substantive law applicable to the claim,
in the case the law of negligence. They are known as ’facts in issue’ or
’ultimate facts’. The proof of these facts in issue depends, however,
on the detailed facts of the individual case, which are referred to as
’evidential facts’. Thus, for example, in order to prove the fact in
issue, negligence, the claimant might set out to prove the evidential
facts that the defendant drove while drunk, too fast, on the wrong
side of the road, and knocked the claimant down, breaking his leg.
If the claimant or the prosecution does not prove the essential elements (all
or most of them, depending on the type of trial), the defendant is acquitted. If
the elements have been supported by evidence, a prima facie case is established,
1A third type of burden of proof is the tactical burden (Walton 2008). This type of burden can be
simply defined as the procedural shifting of the burden of production in a trial, when the opponent has
discharged his burden of production (Tapper, Cross 2007: 137).
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namely should the defendant not disprove any element, the case stands or falls
only by this evidence. In this case, the burden is on the defendant to provide evi-
dence contrary to the elements and contradicting the claim. The relation between
burden of persuasion and the evidential burden of proof is represented in figure
4.1 (Murphy 2007: 73).
C has the burden of proof
C legal
C evidential
Prima facie case for C Judgment for C
Area of risk
Evidential D
D
Figure 4.1: Burdens of proof
In this figure, the letters C and D stand for the Claimant (or prosecution) and
the Defendant. The claimant has the burden of persuasion, or legal burden of
proof; to meet such burden, he or she has to provide evidence (burden of pro-
duction, or evidential). The defendant, once the prosecution or the claimant has
established a prima facie case, bears the burden of providing contrary evidence
(Evidential D).
A clear example can be provided by criminal proceedings. In criminal law, the
prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime he is charged with (C legal). For instance we can consider the case Mul-
laney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The defendant was charged with murder,
and the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intentionally committed an unlawful homicide - i.e., neither justifiable nor ex-
cusable, and that he acted with malice aforethought by providing evidence, and
therefore fulfilling a burden of producing evidence (C Evidential). Circumstan-
tial evidence showed that he fatally assaulted the victim (C provides evidence
and meets the evidential burden). The defense had the burden to produce evi-
dence contrary to the findings (D evidential), and claimed that the homicide was
not unlawful since respondent lacked criminal intent, and that he lacked malice
aforethought, as he acted in the heat of passion provoked by the victim’s assault
(D meets the burden of producing evidence). After the defense fulfilled the bur-
den of production, the prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
absence of the heat of passion. The area of risk is the relation between the burden
of production of the claimant or the prosecution (C evidential), and the burden
of production of the defendant (D evidential): if the defense cannot rebut the ev-
idence provided by the prosecution, the verdict will be reached on the basis of
the prosecution’s arguments.
This case is particularly interesting, because it was based on a redefinition
of the crime of murder including the concept of ’malice aforethought’. Before
this case, in Maine (where the judgment was rendered), like in other states of
the United States, the prosecution acted on the presumption that “if the prose-
cution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice
aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a
fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sud-
den provocation”. In this case, the presumption would have shifted the burden
of proof onto the defendant (see Rhodes v. J Brigano 91 F.3d 803 (1996)). The
essential elements of murder were the fact that the accused caused the death of
the victim, and that he acted on purpose. The classification of the homicide as a
murder or a voluntary manslaughter was considered a matter of qualification: in
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this case, the accused, already proven guilty of a crime, has to rebut the presump-
tion that the crime has been committed in normal circumstances (presumption of
sanity, see Tapper, Cross 2007: 145).
4.3 Presumptions: reasoning from lack of knowledge
The notion of presumption in law is extremely complex. Presumptions are instru-
ments for legislatures and courts to shift burdens (Andersen 2003: 111); however,
the reason of such a shift can be found in the notion of presumptive reasoning.
Presumptive reasoning is a kind of reasoning that works in conditions of lack of
knowledge. OnWalton’s account (see Walton 2008a), the notions of presumption
and burden of proof are closely related to the argument from ignorance (Walton
1996a). The argument from ignorance can be described as follows (Walton 1995:
150; see also Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008):
MAJOR PREMISE: If A were true, then A would be known to be true.
MINOR PREMISE: It is not the case that A is known to be true.
CONCLUSION: Therefore A is not true.
This type of argument can be explained using the following example (Walton
1996a: 35):
If a serious F.B.I. investigation fails to unearth any evidence that
Mr. X is a communist, it would be wrong to conclude that their re-
search has left them ignorant. It has rather been established that Mr.
X is not one.
This type of argument can be considered as a particular case of a type of rea-
soning from oppositions, in which the relation between absence of knowledge
and negation is made explicit. For instance, we can examine the following pat-
tern of reasoning:
This man is not dead. Therefore he is alive.
The paradigm of the possible men’s conditions of existence is constituted of
only two possibilities: dead or alive. If a man is not dead, he is alive. However,
this type of reasoning in natural language is much more complex. The first com-
plication is that paradigms often admit of several possibilities, like the color of
the eyes; the second problem is that we do not have direct knowledge of what
is negative (Sharma 2004): all we can know is that the man is not known to be
dead. The more general pattern could be represented as follows:
Classification under lack of knowledge 1
PREMISE: If A were X, Y, Z, then A would be known to be X, Y, Z.
PREMISE: It is not the case that A is known to be X, Y, Z
PREMISE: A can be either X, Y, Z, or K. Other possibilities are not known.
CONCLUSION: Therefore A is K.
For instance, if the color of Bob’s eyes is not known, and the only information
available is that his eyes are not blue, not black, nor green, it could be concluded
that his eyes are brown. The paradigm of the possible colors of a man’s eyes
is restricted to a closed paradigm. True or false, dead or alive, are special cases
in which this type of reasoning from oppositions in closed paradigms applies.
There are two possible strategies for rebutting this type of reasoning: show-
ing that A is X (for instance, finding that Bob’s eyes are blue), or attacking the
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paradigm, showing that A can be something else but X, Y, Z, and K (for instance,
showing that eyes can be gray).
Classificatory presumptions in law and in everyday conversation can be an-
alyzed as inferences from lack of knowledge following the scheme above. For
instance, a person is considered to be innocent if he is not known to be guilty;
a murderer is considered to be sane, if he is not known to be insane or have his
mental conditions impaired, a man missing from five years is considered dead if
he not known to be alive.
The concept of paradigm and reasoning from lack of knowledge can be also
applied to reasoning from best explanation. For instance, we can consider the
presumption that a man who killed a person using a deadly weapon did it on
purpose. The pattern of reasoning can be described as follows (from Walton
2002: 44):
Explanation under lack of knowledge
F is a finding or given set of facts.
E is a satisfactory explanation of F .
No alternative explanation E′ is as satisfactory as E.
Therefore, E is plausible, as a hypothesis.
The lack of knowledge here regards the paradigm of the possible explana-
tions. In the event that no other possible explanations of F (killing a person using
a deadly weapon) are known, the conclusion will be that E (the killing was done
on purpose) is the explanation. However, the paradigm of the possible explana-
tions is not simply constituted of one possibility: it is simply not known.
The relation between paradigm and knowledge applies also to another type
of presumption, namely the presumption raised by citing in trial the existence
of a code of practice. Codes of practice stipulate what is the correct practice for
carrying out some activities, such as the protection of personal data or ensuring
a safe workplace. When the code of practice is cited in support of a prosecution,
the burden on proof passes to the defendant to prove that what was done was at
least as good as what prescribed in the code of practice (Ramsey 2007: 470). For
instance, if the defendant is charged with violating the regulation requiring that
an employer shall keep the workplace safe (Article 5(1) of the Order), the prose-
cution can cite the code of conduct provided in those situations. If the employer
is shown not to have abided by one or more provisions, he is presumed to have
violated the regulation (see Paul Scott v. AIB Group (UK) PLC t/a First Trust
Bank, NICA 3 2003). In this case, the reasoning proceeds from the ignorance of
other possible actions carried out to achieve a the wanted result, and can be rep-
resented as follows:
Cause under lack of knowledge
If actions A,B,C, are carried out, X is achieved.
Action A has not been carried out.
No other actions to achieve X are known to have been carried out.
Therefore, X has not been achieved.
Also in this case, the reasoning proceeds from the absence of knowledge of
the elements of a paradigm.
The types of schemes from presumption are particular forms of reasoning
from classification, effect to cause, and cause to effect in conditions of lack of
knowledge. They can be considered to be heuristic forms of reasoning, aimed at
providing a conclusion in a dialogue setting. The presumption is grounded on
the concept of lacking evidence; for this reason, it shifts the burden to complete
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the missing information or incomplete paradigm to the other party. In criminal
cases, the burden of persuasion never shifts in cases of presumption. The defen-
dant is simply required to provide evidence and thereby complete the structure
of reasoning. When the offense is determined, for instance the defendant has
been found guilty of a crime, the issue changes, and he has the burden of proving
some possible mitigations and qualifications. In civil cases, in some states in the
United States, the party opposing a presumption has to disprove the presump-
tion by preponderance of evidence. However, also in this case, the burden of
persuasion regarding the issue remains on the claimant, and the party opposing
the presumption has to either provide a different credible explanation or provide
adequate evidence (see (Buckles 2003: 45).
4.4 Presumptions as heuristic patterns of reasoning
The analysis of legal presumptions highlights a crucial distinction between two
patterns of reasoning. The formal paradigm of necessarily true inferences, based
on the relation between quantifiers, cannot hold if applied to human reasoning,
inwhich quantifiers are usually omitted, and inwhich only few absolute truths, if
any, can be the ground for necessary conclusions. Human reasoning stems from
commonly accepted premises, that is, endoxa (see Walton and Macagno 2006),
and proceed to conclusions through another type of accepted propositions, the
ancient maxims, or principles of inference, partially included in the modern con-
cept of argumentation schemes. For instance, the passage from some data to a
classification is warranted by the scheme from verbal classification, which can be
represented as follows (Walton 2006: 129):
Individual
Premise:
a has property F .
Classification
Premise:
For all x, if x has property F , then x can be classified
has having property G.
Conclusion: a has property G
In the tradition, the classification premise was expressed as a maxim from
definition, such as “what the definition is said of, the definiendum is said of as
well” (see Macagno and Walton 2008a). In law like in everyday conversation, it
often happens that the evidence we have does not fit the definition of the concept.
For instance, one of the accepted definitions of manslaughter is “the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice aforethought”; however, how can we
classify an event as ’unlawful’, or ’without malice’? if malice is the ’intention
to do injury to another party’, how can an intention be established? If the law
provides that ’An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions
of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead’, how can brain activities be
considered to have ceased?. Furthermore, how can a man be considered dead or
alive when he is missing? We can notice how the following types of reasoning
are different:
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Reasoning from definition Reasoning from presumptions
— This man unlawfully killed
a woman without malice afore-
thought
— This man stabbed a woman to
death
— Manslaughter is the unlawful
killing of a human being without
malice aforethought
— If a wound is inflicted with a
deadly weapon in a manner calcu-
lated to destroy life, malice is pre-
sumed.
— Therefore this man committed
manslaughter
— This man acted with malice
The second pattern of reasoning is not grounded on a definition at all, even
though it can be considered a kind of classification of malice. This type of heuris-
tic classifications or reasoning from presumptions (see Gigerenzer et al. 1999)
is grounded on a different type of commonly known propositions, namely rules
of thumb, stereotypes, habits (Amossy, Herschberg-Perrot 1997; Schauer 2003;
Cohen 1977). They do not constitute the shared semantic system, nor the legal
semantic structure (see also Perelman 1963: 170). We can represent the different
levels of commonly shared propositions as shown in figure 4.2.
Common 
Knowledge
Stereotypes 
(Americans love 
cars). 
Relations of succession 
(if something was in a 
certain state before, it will 
be in that state later on).
Values (love is 
good).
Hierarchies 
(freedom is better 
than richness).
Definitions (murder 
is the unlawful 
killing of a person 
with malice 
aforethought).
Rules of inference 
(what a definition is 
said of, the 
definiendum is said 
of as well).
Dialogical rules (the 
speaker is 
committed to what 
he says). 
S
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Argumentation 
schemes (For all x, 
if x has property F, 
then x can be 
classified as having 
property G).
Figure 4.2: Levels of common knowledge
This figure is obviously an ideal representation of what ideally is considered
as a stronger commitment. Depending on the type of discussion, and education
and culture of the interlocutors, some stereotypes may even prevail over dia-
logue rules.
The two patterns of reasoning can be represented by two different versions of
the same argument scheme. For instance, if we consider arguments from clas-
sification, we can notice that they can proceed from the normal scheme or the
classification under lack of knowledge, namely from positive evidence or incom-
plete paradigms. Classificatory arguments can be grounded on definitions or
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stereotypes, they can proceed frommaxims of definition or other weaker rules of
inference requiring qualifications (for instance, if I define a house as four walls
and a roof, and if there are four walls and a roof, then in some circumstances
there can be a house as well).
The distinction between these two types of schemes, what we can call the
“dialectical” schemes using the medieval name for them, and the heuristic or
presumptive schemes is the basis for examining the different force of the con-
clusions and the possibility of rebutting them. In the first case, the interlocutor
has to rebut the premises in order to rebut the conclusion. For instance, if one
party argues that Bob committed a murder because he killed a woman unlaw-
fully and with malice aforethought, the opponent can dispute the facts or the
definition of ’murder’, even though in law this possibility would be extremely
complex. In case of heuristic reasoning, the interlocutor does not have to rebut
the premises, but simply introduce new evidence. For instance, if the prosecution
presumes that the homicide was committed maliciously, as the accused stabbed
the victim, the defendant can simply show that it was an accident. The different
role and strength of the two patterns of reasoning can be shown by the effects of
the redefinition of ’rape’ in Canada. In Scotland and other states, the concept of
no-consent to a sexual act is stated as a presumptive, heuristic definition, impos-
ing onto the defendant only the burden of providing evidence (Ferguson, Raitt
2006: 196). For instance, no-consent is presumed when the victim was asleep,
or if violence or threats were used (Sexual offences act, s. 42). On the contrary,
the Canadian Criminal Code includes the presumptive elements as definitions of
“no consent” (section 244(3); Temkin 2002: 117):
For the purpose of this section, no consent is obtained where the
complainant submits or does not resist by reason of:
(a) the application of force to the complainant or to a person other
than the complainant
(b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or
to a person other than the complainant
(c) fraud
(d) the exercise of authority
Whereas in the first case the defendant has only to provide evidence or a dif-
ferent explanation for the presumptions, in the second case he has burden of
persuading that the victim was consentient. The two different treatments of the
concept of ’no-consent’ show how the strength of different types of human rea-
soning can affect the dialogue setting.
4.5 Conclusion
Presumption is a complex concept in law, affecting the dialogue setting. How-
ever, it is not clear how presumptions work in everyday argumentation, in which
the concept of “plausible argumentation” seems to encompass all kinds of infer-
ences. By analyzing the legal notion of presumption, it appears that this type
of reasoning combines argument schemes with reasoning from ignorance. Pre-
sumptive reasoning can be considered a particular form of reasoning, which
needs positive or negative evidence to carry a probative weight on the conclu-
sion. For this reason, presumptions shift the burden of providing evidence or
explanations onto the interlocutor. The latter can provide new information or
fail to do so: whereas in the first case the new information rebuts the presump-
tion, in the second case, the absence of information that the interlocutor could
master April 26, 2010 16:21 Page 57 !"#$
!"#$ !"#$
!"#$
DIALECTICAL AND HEURISTIC ARGUMENTS 57
reasonably provide strengthen the conclusion of the presumptive reasoning. In
both cases the result of the presumption is to strengthen the conclusion of the
reasoning from lack of evidence.
As shown in the legal cases, the effect of presumption is to shift the burden of
proof to the interlocutor; however, the shift a presumption effects is only the shift
of the evidential burden, or the burden of completing the incomplete knowledge
from which the conclusion was drawn. The burden of persuasion remains on
the proponent of the presumption. On the contrary, reasoning from definition
in law is a conclusive proof, and shifts to the other party the burden to prove
the contrary. This crucial difference can be applied to everyday argumentation:
natural arguments can be divided into dialectical and presumptive arguments,
leading to conclusions materially different in strength.
